Romania''s post-communist foreign policy can be divided roughly into three phases. The first phase, between 1990 and 1996, saw Romania''s foreign policy as a victim of the country''s directionless self-absorption, caught in a post-communist power struggle which on one hand saw the entrenched political parties attempting to portray Western-mindedness as a threatening and potentially destabilising force, while at the same time, trying to snatch away the cloak of Western respectability for their own benefit. A complete disregard for a coherent foreign policy, coupled with misguided and confused domestic policies took Romania into the political wilderness, leaving its neighbours to pass it by and quickly move towards NATO and EU membership. In this regard, Romania''s first six years of democracy resulted in an entirely failed foreign policy.
With the successful arrival on the political scene of Romania''s first reform-minded coalition, its foreign policy was galvanised into action, rushing to recapture some of the lost ground. Helped considerably by the Yugoslav crisis, which focused Western minds on stabilising and securing the Balkans, Romania managed to secure the first and more accessible step of joining NATO. At the same time it began, in earnest, the long process of EU accession. For nearly a decade, until the 2004 elections, Romania''s trajectory was more or less clear and unambiguous, if not always necessarily as successful as it might have wanted it to be. Though often clumsily, Romania did ultimately manage to balance EU and US interest and tread a fine line between the two. Nevertheless, as a result of this clumsiness, instead of seizing the opportunity to play the role of a diplomatic mediator between an increasingly bellicose United States and a drifting Europe, Romania all too often became itself a political football between diverging transatlantic interests.
The sudden election of Traian Basescu to the presidency in 2004 brought about an equally rapid shift of gears in Romania''s foreign policy. It was as if a Kissinger or a Talleyrand had become head of state. Romania''s foreign policy took centre stage and everything seemed to revolve around it. The Washington-London-Bucharest axis was declared - to the somewhat bemused surprise of Britain, while sadly, it was barely mentioned in any of the United State''s leading newspapers. The Black Sea, traditionally an uninteresting backwater, became the focus of a major security push. It was as if Romania was fighting off a deluge of smuggled arms, terrorists and marauding pirates. One wonders what the Turks, Ukrainians and Georgians must have been thinking! As well, Romania seemed to take it upon itself to become the great democratising force in the region - an odd aspiration for more than one reason. Last but not least, the first months of Basescu''s presidency were dominated by a still to be fully explained "hostage crisis," largely ignoring the fact that 22 million Romanians have themselves been held hostage to corruption and poverty since 1989.
This sudden and aggressive shift towards the United States has created confusion amongst European leaders, not to mention a lack of credibility. It needs to be clarified that I am neither in favour of a pro-American foreign policy; no do I support a blind pro-European policy. In my mind, any foreign policy should be first and foremost pro-Romanian. We should understand that friendship, as such, does not exist amongst states - just as hate also does not exist. All that exists are different political and economic interests. Sometimes they coincide with the interests and objectives of others and thus alliances are born, and other times they may clash, thereby creating enmity. These alignments might coincide for only a moment, or for centuries, but "friendship" has little to do with it (an eloquent example is the lack of support the United Kingdom received from the US during the Falklands War in the early Eighties).
So then, what should Romania''s foreign policy interests be? Clearly, joining the European Union should indisputably be our most important objective. This is not because the EU is inherently good, but rather, because it plays, and will continue to play, such a critical role in Romania''s economic welfare. Almost all of our most important companies are owned by EU-based companies: nearly our entire banking system, our energy resources, our telecommunications, gas and electricity distribution systems and much of our industry. Moreover, nearly two million Romanians are working and studying in the EU. As such, it is in our interest to join the EU so as to play as important a role as we can in furthering our interests while at the same time ensuring the strength and viability of the EU.
Another plausible foreign policy objective should be the long-term reunification of Romania with Moldova. This does not have to occur tomorrow in a hysterical bout of patriotism; indeed, such an approach would most likely hinder Romania''s efforts. Instead, Romania needs to calmly but steadfastly explain to the international community its case for reunification. It should keep hope alive in Moldova and at the same time, prepare Romanians for the costs, but also the necessity, of such a reunification. Just as Germany was reunified and the former Soviet Republics were granted independence, so too Moldova must one day be reunified with Romania.
Clearly, reunifying Romania, by default, also means addressing the Transnistria problem, which is not an easy nut to crack. But it does not mean "securing" the Black Sea or "democratising" the Caucasus. Neither does it require the formation of an Axis.
Romania''s newly found foreign policy puts at risk our European interests and, paradoxically, makes reunification more difficult to approach. President Basescu needs to explain to Romanians, our neighbours and allies the basis of this stridently pro-American foreign policy. What does Romania stand to gain from such a policy? As they say in finance, where''s the upside? What, for example, have we gained from our involvement in Iraq?
As things stand now, I see plenty of potential downside: alienating our European colleagues will lessen our influence within the European Union. It will make it more difficult for us to fight for our interests, which will make a possible reunification with Moldova less likely. President Basescu needs to explain, and possibly rethink, his reasoning as he is quickly reverting to Romania''s sad history of ineffectual foreign policy.
* Matei Paun is a managing partner of BAC Investment Bank (Romania) and Member of the Board of the Romania Think Tank.
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